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KENTUcKY LAW Jou-NAL
CORPORATE STATE INCOME TAx-SALEs FACTOR OF APPORTIONMENT
Fom roA -Heaven Hill Distilleries, a Kentucky corporation, was taxed
by the Commonwealth for the years 1951 to 1955 on income derived
from sales made and negotiated outside of Kentucky with delivery
to be made outside of the state. The sales and bottling contracts
were made and negotiated by Heaven Hill Company, Inc., an Ill-
inois corporation, pursuant to an exclusive sales agreement with
the Kentucky corporation. The two corporations were wholly inde-
pendent of each other and sales were made and negotiated through
out-of-state offices owned, staffed and maintained by the Illinois cor-
poration and over which the petitioner had no control. The trial court
entered a twofold judgment setting aside assessments for 1954 and
1955 and ordering the Commonwealth to refund the income taxes paid
for the years 1951, 1952, and 1953. On appeal, reversed. In a very
concise opinion, Judge Bird stated: "To avoid allocation of out-
of-state sales to Kentucky, the taxpayer must not only negotiate the
sales outside of Kentucky but must in addition thereto negotiate them
from offices, agencies and places of business maintained by the tax-
payer outside of the state." Luckett v. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc.,
386 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Ky. 1960).
The holding in this case is a further attempt to properly con-
strue a most important section of the allocation formula for determ-
ining the portion of total corporate income subject to taxation by
Kentucky. Like many other states, Kentucky has sought to devise a
means of taxing corporate income which is attributable to business
done within the state.1 Various methods are available, but Kentucky
has selected a formula consisting of three factors: tangible property,
payroll and sales. 2 The percentages of these factors which are at-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
they have not as yet been decided. They are: Konigsberg v. California State
Bar, 29 U.S.L. Week 8294 (Jan. 26, 1960) (No. 28) (denial of admission to
the bar solely because of refusal to answer questions about Communist Party
membership after having been warned that refusal to answer pertinent ques-
tions would be ground for rejecting his application); In re Anastaple, 29 U.S.L.
Week 3195 (March 18, 1960) (No. 58) (denial of admission to the bar solely
because of refusal to answer questions regarding the Communist Party or any
subversive organization listed on the U. S. Attorney General's list; and Cohen
v. Hurley, 29 U.S.L. Week 3195 (May 7, 1960) (No. 84) (disbarment of at-
torney for refusing to answer questions or produce subpoenaed records duringjudicial investigation of ambulance chasing).
I See Lynn, "Formula Apportionment of Corporate Income for State Tax
Purposes: Natura Non Facit Saltun"' 18 Ohio St. L.J. 84 (1957). For an excel-
lent work on the whole problem, see Altman & Keesling, Allocation of Income
in State Taxation (1950).2 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 141.120(4) (b) (hereinafter cited as KRS) provides:
Where income is derived from the manufacture or sale of tangible
personal property, the portion thereof attributable to business within
(Footnote continued on next page)
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tributable to Kentucky when averaged together will give the per-
centage of the total amount of income which the state can properly
tax.3
Computing the percentage of each individual factor in order to
arrive at the ultimate percentage of the income to be taxed is no
easy matter. This comment will consider only the sales factor. Ac-
cording to KRS 141.120(4) (f), the percentage of this factor allocable
to Kentucky is determined as follows:
Receipts from sales and other sources shall be assigned only to the
office, agency or place of business of the corporation at which the
transactions giving rise to the receipts are chiefly negotiated.
Comparing this provision to the holding of the principal case, it is
evident that the court has interpreted this statute to mean that the
only sales not allocable to Kentucky are those negotiated at a place
of business maintained by the corporation outside of Kentucky. The
addition of the word "maintained" has had important effects in the
field of corporate income tax and, as would be expected, has been
attacked by corporate taxpayers.
The first case to consider KRS 141.120(4) (f) was Allphin v. Glen-
more Distilleries Co.4 Glenmore, a corporation engaged in the sale
of whiskey, which had its main offices in Louisville, Kentucky and
its production plant in Daviess County, Kentucky. The corporation
had sales offices in twenty-nine states and salesmen in sixteen addi-
tional states who were responsible to the district and regional offices.
Orders secured by the salesmen in those forty-nine states were sent
first to Louisville for approval and then to the plant in Daviess County
for shipment. Payments on accounts were made to the Louisville
office.
The Department of Revenue argued that under KRS 141.120
(4) (f) the mere fact the orders were procured outside of Kentucky
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
this state shall be taken to be such percentage of the total of such
income as the value of the tangible roy, the payroll and busi-
ness within this state bears to the value of the total tangible prop-
erty, total payroll, and total business, the percentage of tangible
property, of payroll and of business, being separately determined
as hereinafter provided, and the three percentages averaged.
3 The process is explained in more detail by Lynn, supra note 1, at 89:
Most apportionment formulae presently in use include three factors.
They are most commonly sales, payrolls, and property. Ratios are
determined indicating the relation between that portion of each factor
attributable to the taxing state and the total value of that factor.
Such ratios are averaged and the resultant percentage is applied
to total income to determine the portion of such income properly
attributable to the taxing state.
4 270 S.W.2d 168 (Ky. 1954).
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would not prevent allocation of the income from out-of-state orders
to this state if the "predominant elements of the sales transactions"
took place within Kentucky.5 The trial court held for Glenmore, how-
ever, emphasizing the fact that the sales were "chiefly negotiated,"
as used in the statute, outside of the Commonwealth since the orders
were procured in other states.6 On affirming, the Court of Appeals
stated:
It is our opinion that the lower court properly construed the
statute in not assigning to Kentucky the receipts from sales procured
by sales representatives operating out of offices, agencies or places
of business maintained by the corporation outside of Kentucky.7
(Emphasis added).
Thus, it can be seen that the Court of Appeals did a great deal
more than merely affirm the lower court, for it read the word main-
tained into the meaning of the statute. The court justified this inter-
pretation on the ground that four other jurisdictions which had
somewhat similar statutes used this construction.8
The only other case involving KRS 141.120(4) (f) is Luckett v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co.,9 decided four years after the Glenmore case.
There, Coca Cola, a Kentucky corporation with its manufacturing
and bottling plants in Kentucky, made on-the-spot sales directly from
its trucks in Indiana. Such sales were made for both cash and credit
by the drivers who loaded their trucks in Louisville and who re-
turned there with the empty bottles. Coca Cola paid Indiana a gross
receipts tax on the sales and a store license fee for each truck so
operated there. In holding that these on-the-spot salds should be
allocatd to Kentucky, the court stated:
We believe it is obvious the Legislature intended, and the Glen-
more case held in construing the provisions of law under scrutiny, that
the locus of the sale is made dependent upon the site of the office,
agency or place of business out of which the salesman works. Especi-
ally do we gather this idea from the Glenmore case, because in that
5 Id. at 169.
6 Ibid.
7 Id. at 170.8 Id. at 169, citing Commissioner of Corp's and Taxation v. Ford Motor
Co., 808 Mass. 558, 83 N.E.2d 818 (1941), where Ford manufactured automo-
biles and parts in Massachusetts for sales in Massachusetts and elsewhere; May-
tag Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 218 Minn. 460, 17 N.W.2d 87 (1944),
where Maytag manufactured washing machines in Iowa but maintained a sales
office in Minnesota; Commonwealth v. Minds Coal Mining Corp., 860 Pa. 7, 60
A.2d 14 (1948), where Minds Coal Mining Corp. operated mines in West Vir-
ginia but had its executive and administrative office in Pennsylvania; California
Packing Corp. v. State Tax Comm'r, 97 Utah 867, 93 P.2d 463 (1939), where
California Packing Corp. stored products in Utah which were sold by agents
sent out from its California office.
9 310 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1958).
'oId. at 796.
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opinion the word "maintained" as it appears in connection with
office, agency or place of business carries the connotation of a par-
ticular or fixed location.' 0
Thus, it can be seen that the court by applying the Glenmore case
has consistently used the term "maintained" in construing KRS
141.120(4)(f) even though the requirement is not present in the
statute.
It is interesting to note that the Department of Revenue in its
brief in the Heaven Hill case was of the opinion that the only simi-
larity between the Glenmore decision and the principal case was that
"both cases involve the sale of the same product, namely whiskey."1"
More specifically, the Department pointed out that in the Glenmore
case there was no doubt but that part of the income should be alloca-
ted outside of the state; the question before the court was how much
should be allocated to Kentucky. The Department, however, denied
the existence of this question in the Heaven Hill case in view of
"the cold, hard fact ... that Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc., engages
in no activity that extends beyond the borders of the Common-
wealth save and except for the shipment of its product from Bards-
town in interstate commerce."1 2 By this analysis, the Department takes
the position that a Kentucky corporation cannot enter into a sales
agreement with an independent contractor from another state in order
to escape paying the Kentucky income tax. The fact that the sales
were "negotiated," as stated in the statute,l outside of Kentucky, can-
not control this type of case where it is obvious that to allow it to do
so would mean a total loss of revenue to the Commonwealth.
There is naturally a fear of double-taxation in cases such as this,
but one should realize that "taxation in one state is not an immuni-
zation against taxation in other states."' 4 It is highly possible that
more than one state will render services to a single corporation for
which they should be compensated through payment of taxes. It is
wise, therefore, that the court has elected to place emphasis on the
question of who maintains the out-of-state office from which the
sales are negotiated. If the taxpayer maintains the office, then there
is a strong argument for the proposition that Kentucky should re-
linquish any claim to such sales in view of the fact that the state in
which the office is located is giving the taxpayer benefits for which
taxes should be paid to that state. If, however, the maintenance of
11 Brief for Appellants, p. 17.
12 Id. at 26.13 KRS 141.120(4) (f).
14 Vest Pub. Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, -, 166 P.2d 861, 864,
aff'd, ,328 U.S. 823 (1946).
1961]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
such offices is the obligation of an independent contractor, such as
the Illinois corporation in the principal case, then the spirit of KRS
141.120(4)(f) is defeated if merely negotiating the sales outside
of Kentucky will remove them from the Commonwealth's taxing
power.
William M. Dishman
DAMAGEs-PRoPiEY OF PER DriEM VALUATION OF PAIN AND SUFFEMRNG
BY COUNSEL IN CLOSING ARGUMENT-Plaintiff was injured when a box
car, set in motion by the failure of a coupling device on defendant's
locomotive, struck the coal car under which he was working. In an
action for damages for personal injuries, the trial court ruled that the
defendant was negligent as a matter of law, and submitted the issues
of contributory negligence and the assessment of damages to the jury.
From a verdict and judgment of $20,000 defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals held that the verdict was excessive with respect to
the following items of proof: (1) the effect of a pre-existing back
injury upon the plaintiffs present condition was not clearly estab-
lished; (2) plaintiff was never hospitalized; (3) plaintiff had con-
tinued to perform certain occupations; and (4) proved medical ex-
penses, including estimates of future treatment, were only $566.
Pursuant to Rule 59.01 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, a
new trial was granted for the sole purpose of determining the issue
of damages.' At the second trial, counsel was permitted to list vari-
ous elements of plaintiff's damages on a blackboard in closing argu-
ment, including an amount for pain and suffering calculated at five
dollars per day for the length of his life expectancy. From a verdict
and judgment of $62,331 defendant appealed. Held: Affirmed. The
court reasoned that, on the basis of the medical testimony pre-
sented at the second trial, the jury could have properly concluded
that plaintiff's disability was not attributable to his pre-existing
injury, but resulted solely from the negligence of the defendant.2
In regard to the blackboard summation presented by counsel, the
court reasoned that it is no more speculative to suggest daily com-
pensation for plaintiffs pain and suffering than it would be to suggest
a total amount. Further, since the jury must make a specific alloca-
tion of damages for pain and suffering, counsel should be permitted
I Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1958).
2"The evidence adduced in this respect [concerning plaintiff's pre-existing
injury] on the second trial was clearly more positive and would have been suffi-
cient to sustain the original verdict." (Emphasis added). Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Mattingly, 339 S.W. 2d 155, 157 (Ky. 1960).
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